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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PREDICTABILITY AS FAIRNESS AND
THE POSSIBLE RETURN TO FEDERAL INDETERMINATE
SENTENCING
United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005)
DanielRyan Koslosky"
Respondent' was convicted by a jury of possession with intent to
distribute at least fifty grams of crack cocaine. 2 During postconviction
sentencing, the district court judge found, by a preponderance of evidence,
that Respondent possessed an additional 566 grams of crack cocaine 3 and
obstructed justice.4 Pursuant to the applicable United States Sentencing
Guidelines (Federal Guidelines), the judge increased Respondent's
sentence to a minimum of thirty years imprisonment.5 Respondent
challenged the district court's application of the Federal Guidelines on the
grounds that it violated his Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury.6 The

* J.D. expected, 2007, University ofFlorida Levin College of Law; M.Sc. expected, 2006,
London School of Economics and Political Science. For Dan and Kim Koslosky-with gratitude.
1. Respondent's name was Freddie J. Booker. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738
(2005). Consolidated with the Booker case was United States v. Fanfan, No. 03-47, 2004 WL
1723114 (D. Me. June 28, 2004), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 12 (2004). Respondent Fanfan was
arrested and convicted of conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute at least
500 grams of cocaine. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 747 (Stevens, J.). During postconviction sentencing,
thejudge found by a preponderance of the evidence that Fanfan possessed, interalia,2.5 kilograms
of cocaine, but the judge did not impose the sentence enhancements provided for in the guidelines.
Id. (Stevens, J.). The Supreme Court joined the claims of both respondents on the ground that the
constitutional issues presented in each claim were identical. Id. (Stevens, J.). But see id. at 795
(Thomas, J., dissenting in part) (arguing that the application of the sentencing guidelines in
Booker's case resulted in unconstitutional judicial factfinding but that Fanfan's sentence was
constitutional).
2. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 746 (Stevens, J.). The jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that
Booker possessed 92.5 grams of crack cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(l) (2000). Id.
(Stevens, J.). The applicable sentencing range for such a violation was between ten years and life
imprisonment. Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) (2000)). The district court judge had
discretion to incarcerate Booker for a period of between 210 and 262 months based on the quantity
and type of narcotic and on prior criminal history. Id. (Stevens, J.) (citing U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 2D1.1(c)(4), 4A1.1 (2003)).

3. Id. (Stevens, J.).
4. Id. (Stevens, J.).
5. Id. (Stevens, J.). The district court judge's finding of the additional drugs increased
Booker's base offense level from thirty-two to thirty-six, thereby giving the judge discretion to
impose a sentence between 360 months and life imprisonment. United States v. Booker, 375 F.3d
508, 509 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 2D1 (c)(2), (4), 3C1.1
(2003)).
6. See Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 747 (Stevens, J.). The Sixth Amendment provides in part that
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Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the sentence, holding
that the district court's application of the Federal Guidelines violated the
Sixth Amendment.7 The Supreme Court granted certiorari,' and in
affirming the court of appeals in a dual opinion, HELD that the Sixth
Amendment requires that all facts necessary to support a sentence greater
than the relevant statutory maximum of the Federal Guidelines be found
by ajury,9 and that the Federal Guidelines are to become advisory because
their mandatory nature is incompatible with the constitution's jury trial
guarantee.' 0
The Federal Guidelines were enacted to remedy the sentencing
disparities of the federal indeterminate sentencing system." Congress
adopted the Federal Guidelines, which established determinate sentencing
ranges for various categories of criminal offenses. 2 The Sixth Amendment
provides that "the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,
by an impartial jury."' 3 However, beginning with McMillan v.
Pennsylvania,'4 state and federal courts have traditionally confined the
"[iln all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
U.S.
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed .
CONST. amend. VI.

7. Booker, 375 F.3d at 515. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit did not address
the question of severability. Id.
8. United States v. Booker, 125 S.Ct. 11 (2004).
9. Booker, 125 S.Ct. at 756 (Stevens, J.).
10. Id. at 756-57 (Breyer, J.).
11. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 366-67 (1989). The MistrettaCourt observed
that "Congress delegated almost unfettered discretion" to sentencingjudges under the indeterminate
sentencing system. Id.at 364. Under the federal indeterminate sentencing regime, a sentencing
judge would impose a sentence within a congressionally defined range and a parole official would
subsequently determine the actual time of incarceration. Id.at 365-66. The Court noted that the
system led to "widespread dissatisfaction with the uncertainties" regarding federal sentencing. Id.
at 366; see also Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 557-58 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(describing discretion judges enjoyed prior to Federal Guidelines); Koon v. United States, 518 U.S.
81, 113 (1996) (stating that pre-Guidelines system of indeterminate sentencing lacked uniformity,
predictability, and detachment); Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politicsof SentencingReform: The
Legislative History of the FederalSentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 223, 226-30
(1993) (noting that judicial power was unchecked under indeterminate sentencing and disparity was
a result); infra note 86 and accompanying text (noting that judges will have great discretion in the
absence of guidelines).
12. Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193, 195 (1992). The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984
authorized the creation of the United States Sentencing Commission, which promulgated the
Federal Guidelines. Id.; see Ilene H. Nagel, StructuringSentencing Discretion: The New Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINoLoGy 883, 883-88 (1990) (discussing the

historical context behind the development of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines); Julie R.
O'Sullivan, In Defense ofthe U.S. Sentencing Guidelines' Modified Real-Offense System, 91 Nw.
U. L. REv. 1342, 1352-62 (1997) (describing Congress's goal in creating the Guidelines).
13. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

14. 477 U.S. 79, .85-86 (1986); see Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 751 (Stevens, J.).
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to only the finding of6 facts
federal constitution's jury trial guarantee
5
constituting elements of the crime' and not to sentencing factors.'
In McMillan, the Supreme Court considered whether a Pennsylvania
sentencing guideline requiring the trial judge to find sentencing factors, by
a preponderance of the evidence, 7 violated petitioners' Sixth Amendment
right to a trial by jury. 8 The guideline in question prescribed that any
person convicted of an enumerated felony was subject to a minimum term
of incarceration if the sentencing judge found that the felon used a firearm
while committing the crime."
The Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment required that only
elements included in the legislative definition of the offense be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt.20 Moreover, as a matter of federalism,2 the
Court stated that postconviction factors used to ascertain the appropriate
term of incarceration are beyond the scope of the Sixth Amendment.22
Accordingly, the McMillan Court held that due process is not offended
when a sentencing judge utilized a fact not found by a jury beyond a
15. See, e.g., McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79,85 (1986). The Court noted that "'the
Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable
Process
Due
doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged."' Id.at 84 (quoting
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970)).
16. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 86; see also Booker, 125 S.Ct. at 803 (Breyer, J., dissenting in
part) (noting that history does not support a right to have all sentencing facts found by a jury);
United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 511-13 (1995) (noting that, historically, juries did not have
to make a finding of fact for each sentencing fact).
17. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 80-81 (citing 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9712 (1982)).
18. Id. at 80. Each of the four petitioners was convicted by a jury of an enumerated felony
to which the guideline was applicable, but none was sentenced under the guideline because of the
sentencing courts' reservations as to its constitutionality. Id. at 82. The Commonwealth appealed,
and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court consolidated the claims. Id. at 83.
19. Id. at 81-82.
20. Id. at 85. The McMillan Court does, however, note that there were certain circumstances
in which the "reasonable-doubt requirement applies to facts not formally identified as elements of
the offense charged." Id. at 86. The Court, however, refrained from defining the "extent to which
due process forbids the reallocation or reduction of burdens of proof in criminal cases." Id.
21. Id. at 85. The Supreme Court noted that it had traditionally been 'within the power of
the State to regulate procedures under which its laws are carried out, including the burden of
producing evidence and the burden of persuasion."' Id. (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S.
197, 201-02 (1977)). The Court also reaffirmed earlier holdings that judicial review of state judicial
policies under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment were to be deferential "unless
'it offend[ed] some principle ofjustice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as
to be ranked as fundamental.' Id. (quoting Patterson,432 U.S. at 201-02); see Dorszynski v.
United States, 418 U.S. 424, 440-41 (1989) (stating that sentencing authority is vested in the trial
judge and not subject to appellate review); infra note 86 and accompanying text.
22. See McMillan, 477 U.S. at 91-92. The Court explained that "[o]nce the reasonable-doubt
standard has been applied to obtain a valid conviction, 'the criminal defendant has been
constitutionally deprived of his liberty to the extent that the State may confine him."' Id. at 92 n.8
(quoting Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976)).
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reasonable doubt to sentence a defendant.23
The Supreme Court in Almendarez-Torres v. UnitedStates24 affirmed
the Sixth Amendment framework articulated in McMillan, holding that a
criminal indictment does not need to include facts pertaining only to
sentencing." Petitioner had entered a guilty plea for illegally re-entering
the United States after a previous deportation.26 Without advance notice,27
petitioner's sentence was increased beyond what the facts contained in the
indictment authorized. The Almendarez-TorresCourt held that a criminal
indictment is required to contain only those facts relevant to the
legislatively defined offense, and therefore the increased sentence was
appropriate .29

In a dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia asserted that the majority's
holding was inconsistent with common-law tradition.3 ° Justice Scalia
further noted that it would be unfair to deny a criminal defendant a jury
determination on a fact which stood to enhance his sentence.31
The differing Sixth Amendment implications corresponding to offense
elements and to sentencing factors was significantly eroded by the Court

23. Id. at 91. The Court noted that "'[T]he Due Process Clause requires the prosecution to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements included in the definition of the offense of
which the defendant is charged."' Id. at 85 (quoting Patterson, 432 U.S. at 210) (alteration in
original) (emphasis added by McMillan). Postconviction judicial factfinding, by a preponderance
of the evidence, under the Federal Guidelines was also found not to violate due process in a
subsequent case. United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 156 (1997).
24. 523 U.S. 224 (1998).
25. Id. at 228.
26. Id. at 227. Petitioner entered a guilty plea for violating 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (1988), which
makes it a crime for any alien who, subsequent to being deported, "'enters .... or is at any time
found in, the United States."' Id. at 229 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(2) (1988)) (alteration in
original).
27. Id. at 227 (noting that petitioner's indictment contained no reference to prior convictions).
28. Id. Under the facts set forth in the indictment the petitioner was subject to a sentence of
no more than two years imprisonment. Id. The petitioner, as part of the plea agreement, stipulated
to being deported subsequent to the three prior aggravated felonies. Id. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 1326(b)(2) (1988) and the U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L 1.2 (1995), the sentencing
judge found the applicable sentencing range to be between seventy-seven and ninety-six months
in prison. Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 227.
29. Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 228 (citing Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117
(1974)). The Court echoed the McMillan rationale by stating that a fact did not automatically
constitute an offense element merely because its presence was connected with the punishment's
severity. Id. at 242. The Court further reiterated the McMillan observation that the legislative
definition of the offense was dispositive as to the Sixth Amendment's applicability. Id.
30. Id. at 261 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia observed that "the fact of prior
convictions had to be charged in the same indictment charging the underlying crime, and submitted
to the jury for determination along with that crime." Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in
original).
31. Id. at 267 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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inApprendiv. New Jersey.32 At issue in Apprendi was aNew Jersey statute

that authorized an enhanced sentence for possession of a firearm if it was
found that the defendant intended to intimidate a particular minority.33 In
invalidating the statute, the Court concluded that a jury must find, beyond
a reasonable doubt, any fact 34that would enhance a sentence beyond the
relevant statutory maximum.
The Apprendi Court stated that the nature of the jury and evidentiary

standards under the common law is such as to require that the Sixth
Amendment apply to contemporary postconviction sentencing
proceedings.35 The Court held that as a matter of fairness, a common law
indictment contains all pertinent circumstances relating to the crime,
36
thereby allowing a defendant to better calculate the punishment sought.
The Apprendi Court preserved McMillan only to the extent that a sentence

does not exceed the statutory maximum authorized by the jury verdict.37
The Court, as a matter of precedence, 38 retained the distinction between a

32. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466,478 (2000). The Court noted that the "distinction between
an 'element' of a felony offense and a 'sentencing factor' was unknown to the practice of criminal
indictment, trial by jury, and judgment by court as it existed during the years surrounding our
Nation's founding." Id. (footnote call number omitted).
33. Id.at 468-69 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-3(e) (West Supp. 1999-2000)). The New
Jersey statute allowed the sentencing judge to determine the defendant's motivation by a
preponderance of the evidence. Id.
34. Id. at 483-84, 490. The relevant "statutory maximum" for Apprendi purposes was the
"maximum sentence ajudge may impose solely on the basis ofthe facts reflected in thejury verdict
or admitted by the defendant." Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2537 (2004) (emphasis in
original).
35. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 477-85. The Court noted that "trial by jury has been understood
to require that 'the truth of every accusation, whether preferred in the shape of indictment,
information, or appeal, should afterwards be confirmed by [a jury]."' Id. at 477 (emphasis omitted)
(quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS ENGLAND 373 (1769)). The Court
also noted that jury determination of circumstances surrounding the underlying felony was
necessitated when a statute provided for an elevated degree of punishment if those circumstances
were present. Id. at 480.
36. Id. at 478-81. The Court noted that the indictment contained "'all the facts and
circumstances which constitute the offence ... stated with such certainty and precision, that the
defendant... may be enabled to determine the species of offence they constitute, in order that he
may prepare his defence accordingly."' Id.at 478 (quoting J. ARCHBOLD, PLEADING AND EVIDENCE
INCRIMINAL CASES 44 (15th ed. 1862)); see also Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S.
224, 261 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that, at common law, fact of prior convictions had
to be charged and submitted to the jury); supranote 31 and accompanying text.
37. See id. at 487 n. 13. TheApprendi Court conceded that it was "arguable" thatAlmendarezTorres was incorrectly decided. Id. at 489. The Court, however, opted to treat Almendarez-Torres
"as a narrow exception to the general rule." Id. at 490; see also United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214,
232 (1876) (Clifford, J., dissenting) (stating that the general rule is that an indictment can describe
the offense in the words of the statute but many exceptions exist where every fact essential to
punishment must be alleged in the indictment).
38. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494-95.
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sentencing factor and an offense element.39
In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Thomas adhered to the
common law requirement that a criminal indictment must contain all facts
necessary to impose the sentence sought by the state.40 Justice Thomas
asserted that McMillan was actually a break from the law's traditional
understanding of the nature of the jury.4 ' Thus, according to Justice
Thomas, Apprendi could be seen as a return to the original meaning of the
jury trial guarantee. Justice Thomas's concurring opinion also noted that
the distinction between a sentencing factor and an offense element is
irrelevant; the dispositive question is how the fact enters into the
sentence.43
In a dissenting opinion, Justice O'Connor adhered to traditional Sixth
Amendment jurisprudence as articulated in McMillan.4 Justice Breyer, in
a separate dissenting opinion, agreed and found the majority's common
law analysis unconvincing,45 further asserting that the jury trial guarantee
is not applicable to judicial postconviction factfinding.46 Justice Breyer
contended that, as a matter of pragmatism, the plethora of potential
sentencing factors may overwhelm a jury, thus leaving judicial
postconviction factfinding as the best alternative. 47
The instant Court adopted the Apprendi rationale by holding that the

39. Id. at 487 n. 13, 494 n. 19. The Court held that the term "sentencing factor" would still be
denoted as a "circumstance, which may be either aggravating or mitigating ...that supports a
specific sentence within the range authorized by the jury's finding." Id. at 494 n. 19. The Court
distinguished a "sentencing enhancement" as a term used to describe "an increase beyond the
maximum authorized statutory sentence" and noted that it was "the functional equivalent of an
element of a greater offense than the one covered by the jury's guilty verdict." Id.; see supra note
16 and accompanying text.
40. Id. at 510-11 (Thomas, J., concurring).
41. Id. at 518 (Thomas, J., concurring).
42. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
43. Id. at 520-21 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas stated that he was "aware of no
historical basis for treating as a nonelement a fact that by law sets or increases punishment." See
id. at 521 (Thomas, J., concurring); see also supra note 32 and accompanying text. But see
Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 242 (1998) (stating that sometimes the state
need not treat a sentencing factor as an element); supra note 29 and accompanying text.
44. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 524-25 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 564-66 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor contended that the common-law
authority on which the majority relied was not inconsistent with the McMillan holding that the right
to a jury trial applied to only those elements defined in the offense. Id. at 526 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting). Specifically, Justice O'Connor asserted that the precedent utilized by the Court
"pertain[ed] to circumstances in which a common-law felony had also been made a separate
statutory offense carrying a greater penalty." Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). But see Blakely v.
Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2536 n.5 (2004) (discussing common-law offenses and when an
indictment must charge aggravating factors).
46. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 564-66 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 557 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Sixth Amendment requires that any fact which increases the maximum
authorized sentence under the Federal Guidelines must be found by a
jury.48 In the first part of the dual opinion, Justice Stevens espoused
Apprendi 's common-law analysis by reiterating that a trial by jury is an
enshrined tenet of American jurisprudence.49 Accordingly, the instant
Court concluded that the jury trial guarantee applies to sentencing made
pursuant to the Federal Guidelines because of their mandatory nature.50
In the latter part of the dual opinion, the instant Court per Justice
Breyer held that the mandatory nature of the Federal Guidelines, and the
applicability of the Sixth Amendment to the same, are incompatible. 5
There, the Court determined that severing the provision that mandates
application of the Federal Guidelines52 would be the least disruptive
alternative in light of the instant Court's new Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence.53
Additionally, the instant Court excised the provision of the Federal
Guidelines that provided for appellate review.54 The instant Court stated
that this provision is incompatible with the instant Court's aforesaid
holdings because of its dependence on the Federal Guidelines mandatory
framework.55 Thus, the instant Court determined that a standard of

48. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 756 (2005) (Stevens, J.).
49. Id. at 752 (Stevens, J.). Justice Stevens noted that the application of the jury trial
guarantee of the Sixth Amendment is "not the product of recent innovations in our jurisprudence,
but rather [has its] genesis in the ideals our constitutional tradition assimilated from the common
law." Id. at 753 (Stevens, J.).
50. Id.at 750 (Stevens, J.). The instant Court recognized that ifthe Federal Guidelines "could
be read as merely advisory provisions that recommended, rather than required, the selection of
particular sentences in response to differing sets of facts, their use would not implicate the Sixth
Amendment." Id. (Stevens, J.). Justice Stevens acknowledged that 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (Supp.
2004) was the provision that made application of the Federal Guidelines mandatory. Id. (Stevens,
J.).
51L Id. at 756 (Breyer, J.).
52. The section in question was 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2000). Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 764
(Breyer, J.). Section 3553(b)(1) stated that "the court shall impose a sentence" and is cited by
Justice Breyer as the provision making the Federal Guidelines mandatory. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)( 1)
(2000) (emphasis added); Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 764 (Breyer, J.). This determination, however, was
reached after Justice Breyer determined that the provision "'the court' read as "'the judge without
the jury."' Id. at 759 (Breyer, J.). Justice Stevens, in a dissenting opinion, suggested that the
"'court' may be interpreted as "includ[ing] ajudge's selection of a sentence as supported by ajury
verdict." Id. at 779 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
53. Id. at 760, 764-65 (Breyer, J.).
54. Id. at 756-57 (Breyer, J.). The excised provision provided that "[u]pon review of the
record, the court of appeals shall determine whether the sentence (1) was imposed in violation of
law." 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (2000) (emphasis added).
55. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 756-57 (Breyer, J.).
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Paramount to the instant Court's conclusions was that the goal of the8
Federal Guidelines was to provide more uniformity to federal sentencing.
The instant Court stated that the Federal Guidelines were enacted to better
correlate punishment with a defendant's actual conduct.59 The instant
Court concluded that application of the jury trial guarantee would create
rigidity in federal sentencing and thereby undermine congressional
intent.6 °
The instant Court noted that sentencing judges would effectively be
deprived of considering information regarding the defendant's actual
conduct that is obtained postconviction.6 ' The instant Court warned that
greater prosecutorial power would result,62 and that plea bargaining would
be relegated to a situation analogous to the indeterminate sentencing
regime. 63
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens stated that extension of the jury
trial guarantee, under the Apprendi framework, to the Federal Guidelines
was not inconsistent with the intent of Congress.' 4 Justice Stevens also
asserted that the instant Court increased uncertainty in the plea process by
making the Federal Guidelines advisory.65 Moreover, the dissent argued

56. Id. at 765 (Breyer, J.).
57. See id. at 765-66 (Breyer, J.). The instant Court noted that the standard of
"unreasonableness" could be inferred from the language of the statute based on "related statutory
language, the structure of the statute, and the 'sound administration of justice."' Id.(Breyer, J.)
(quoting Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552,559-60 (1988)); see also Underwood,487 U.S. at 560
(discussing problems related to the standard of appellate review).
58. See Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 759 (Breyer, J.); supra note 11 and accompanying text.
59. Booker, 125 S.Ct. at 761 (Breyer, J.).
60. See id.at 759 (Breyer, J.).
61. Id.at 762 (Breyer, J.). The Court acknowledged, however, that a conviction could only
be based on conduct contained in the indictment. Id. (Breyer, J.).
62. Id.at 763 (Breyer, J.). The Court noted that "any factor that a prosecutor chose not to
charge at the plea negotiation would be placed beyond the reach of the judge entirely." Id.(Breyer,
J.). But see Julie R. O'Sullivan, In Defense of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines' Modified RealOffense System, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 1342, 1414-17 (1997) (arguing that a charge-offense system is
unlikely to alter the rate of prosecutorial subversion of the Federal Guidelines' uniformity goals).
63. See Booker, 125 S.Ct. at 762-63 (Breyer, J.). Justice Breyer asserted that "plea
bargaining would likely lead to sentences that gave greater weight, not to real conduct, but rather
to the skill of counsel, the policies of the prosecutor, the caseload, and other factors that vary from
place to place." Id.at 763 (Breyer, J.); see also Albert W. Alschuler, The TrialJudge'sRole in Plea
Bargaining,Part1,76 COLUM. L. REV. 1059, 1082-87 (1976) (describing the role of the judge in
plea bargaining and analyzing sentencing disparities dependent on whether the defendant negotiated
a plea or was tried with or without a jury).
64. Booker, 125 S.Ct. at 785-86 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part) (noting that disparities in
federal sentencing were a result of judicially-vested discretion).
65. Id.at 781 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). Justice Stevens asserts that the instant Court
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that sentencing judges would still have been able to impose a sentence
within the range to reflect real conduct and reject any factually false plea
agreement.66
Ultimately, the instant Court is unable to reconcile the competing
interests of providing defendants fairness based on the ability to predict
punishment with judicial discretion to impose a sentence based on actual
conduct.6 7 By making the Federal Guidelines only advisory, the instant
Court risks increasing federal defendants' uncertainty regarding the
sentence to which they are subject.68
The fairness inherent in a defendant's ability to predict, with a degree
of certainty, the sentence to which he is subject has long been
acknowledged by the common-law and state courts.69 However, in its
contemporary Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has
primarily focused on the common law nature of the jury instead. 7' The
instant Court embraces the role of the jury at common law by making the
Sixth Amendment applicable so as to replicate the protections traditionally
offered to defendants under common-law criminal proceedings. 7 '
The corollary of this development in Sixth Amendment jurisprudence
is that defendants are better able to predict the term of incarceration that
they face at the commencement of the criminal proceeding.72 Since all
facts necessary to increase a sentence beyond the statutory maximum must
be submitted to a jury, they also must be included in the indictment.73
Consequently, a criminal defendant 74 has forewarning as to the punishment
"eliminated the certainty of expectations in the plea process." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
66. Id. at 781-82 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
67. See id. at 756 (Breyer, J.) (holding that the mandatory nature of the Federal Guidelines
is incompatible with the instant Court's constitutional holding).
68. See id. at 781 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part); Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523
U.S. 224, 256-57 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting); supra note 64.
69. See Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 753 (Stevens, J.); supra notes 30-31, 35-37, 40 and
accompanying text.
70. See Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2534, 2539-40 (2004); Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 477 (2000); Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 240 (1999); McMillan v.
Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 93 (1986).
71. See Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 753 (Stevens, J.). Justice Thomas asserted earlier that the Fifth
and Sixth Amendments "codified a few particular common-law procedural rights." Apprendi, 530
U.S. at 500 n.1 (Thomas, J., concurring).
72. See Michael Goldsmith, Reconsidering the Constitutionality of Federal Sentencing
Guidelines After Blakely: A Former Commissioner's Perspective, 2004 BYU L. REv. 935,980-81
(2004) (arguing that the Federal Guidelines reduced sentencing disparity); Geraldine Scott Moohr,
An Enron Lesson: The Modest Role of Criminal Law in Preventing Corporate Crime, 55 FLA. L.
REv. 937, 941-42 (stating that under the Federal Guidelines punishment for white collar offenses
was more certain and uniform); supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
73. SeeApprendi, 530 U.S. at 518 (Thomas, J., concurring); Jones v. United States, 526 U.S.
227, 243 n.6 (1999); supra note 29 and accompanying text.
74. See Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 749 (Stevens, J.) (noting that there is no constitutionally
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to which he is subject at the commencement of the prosecution.75 This
result is consistent with the Court's observation inApprendi that a criminal
defendant is entitled to adequately prepare a defense.76
77
The instant Court, in what has been coined a case of "judicial jujitsu,"
undercuts this contemporary development of Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence by making the Federal Guidelines advisory so as not to
implicate the Sixth Amendment. 78 The instant Court increases judicial
discretion in postconviction sentencing to better allow judges to allocate
sentences based on a defendant's actual conduct. 79 The instant Court
justifies this increase in judicial discretion by reasoning that Congress
intended to better link similar conduct by defendants with their
corresponding sentences.8 °
By requiring judges only to consult the Federal Guidelines rather than
be bound by them,8 ' the Booker Court relegates federal sentencing to the
McMillan framework.82 Under a McMillan construction of federal
sentencing, only those factors included in the definition of the offense
would be required to be charged in an indictment.83 By foreclosing Sixth
Amendment applicability to any fact other than those necessary to
constitute an element of the offense, the instant Court reinstates judicial
discretion at sentencing.
However, judges following a strict McMillan construction would be
required to impose a sentence within the applicable range unless they
found information which sanctioned an upward or downward departure.84
Under an exclusively advisory system, however, judges would be required
only to consult the Federal Guidelines, thereby allowing the imposition of
any sentence, with the only caveat being that it cannot be unreasonable

significant difference between the Federal Guidelines and the state sentencing guidelines at issue
in Blakely); Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2548-50 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (implying that there is no
constitutional distinction between the Federal guidelines and the Washington sentencing statute).
75. See supranotes 31-32 and accompanying text. The increased notice provided to criminal
defendants by Justice Steven's approach is evident in the Supreme Court's recent opinion of
Shepard v. United States, 125 S.Ct. 1254, 1263 (2005) (holding that a necessarily admitted guilty
plea to a burglary charge defined by a nongeneric statute is limited to the terms of the plea or
charging document and thereby excludes the police report or complaint).
76. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 478; supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
77. Charles Lane, Sentencing Standards No Longer Mandatory; FederalJudges May
Deviate, Court Rules, WASH. POST, Jan. 13, 2005, at AOl.
78. See Booker, 125 S.Ct. at 750 (Stevens, J.); supra note 50 and accompanying text.
79. See supranotes 11, 59-61, 66 and accompanying text.
80. See supra notes 11, 59-61 and accompanying text.
81. Booker, 125 S.Ct. at 757 (Breyer, J.).
82. See supra notes 16, 20-23 and accompanying text.
83. See supranotes 25, 28-29 and accompanying text.
84. See McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 81 n. 1 (1986) (noting the mandatory nature
of the Pennsylvania sentencing guideline in question); supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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upon review.8 5 The instant Court thus effectively restores an
indeterminate-like federal sentencing regime by giving great deference to
the choices of judges in postconviction proceedings 86 and by delegating
supervisory power outside the arena of the trial court. 7
Common-law criminal jurisprudence was concerned with providing
defendants with fairness based on their ability to predict the sentence to
which they were subject.8 8 Beginning with Apprendi, the Supreme Court
began gradually to broaden the reach of the jury trial guarantee of the
Sixth Amendment so as to replicate the notice that defendants were
afforded under common-law sentencing.89 The instant Court, however,
undercut this trend in criminal jurisprudence by construing the Federal
Guidelines in a manner such as not to implicate the Sixth Amendment.9"
Consequently, criminal defendants may be subject to similar, if not the

85. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
86. See Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424,443 (1974) (stating that well-established
doctrine prevented review of sentencing discretion). Dorszynski was decided under the
indeterminate sentencing system and further stated that "limited review [wa]s available when
sentencing discretion [wa]s not exercised at all." Id. Also consider Mistretta v. United States, 488
U.S. 361, 364 (1989). The Mistrettamajority noted that "[a trial] court's determination as to what
sentence was appropriate met with virtually unconditional deference on appeal." Id.; see also
United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 46 (1978) (stating that a "fundamental proposal" of the
sentencing reform movement was a "flexible sentencing system permitting judges and correctional
personnel, particularly the latter, to set the release date of prisoners according to informed
judgments concerning their potential for, or actual, rehabilitation and their likely recidivism");
Marvin E. Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. CIN. L. REv. 1, 7 (1972) (stating that
sentences under the indeterminate sentencing system were "not appealable except on rare and
extraordinary grounds"); Ilene H. Nagel, Structuring Sentencing Discretion: The New Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 80 J. CRM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 883, 892-93 (1990) (discussing
indeterminate sentencing and the rehabilitative theory of prison and punishment).
87. Recall that under the indeterminate sentencing system the sentencingjudge would impose
a term of incarceration within a congressionally defined range and a parole official would
determine the actual time of incarceration. Mistretta,488 U.S. at 365-66. The MistrettaCourt noted
that sentencing judges were delegated "almost unfettered discretion" that resulted in "widespread
dissatisfaction" with regard to the uncertainties of federal sentencing. Id. at 364-66. Recall
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 558 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting), in which Justice Breyer
adhered to judicial sentencing discretion and noted that "federal law left the individual sentencing
judge free to determine which factors were relevant. That freedom meant that each judge, in an
effort to tailor punishment to the individual offense and offender, was guided primarily by
experience, relevance and a sense of proportional fairness." Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). The term
of incarceration made pursuant to the advisory Federal Guidelines would be determined with
greater judicial discretion and subject to appellate review. The two systems are by no means exact
but instead parallel in their effect on the predictability defendants are afforded. See Frankel, supra
note 86, at 29 (discussing the rationale behind indeterminate sentencing).
88. See supranotes 29-32, 35-56 and accompanying text.
89. See supranotes 72-76 and accompanying text.
90. See supranotes 50, 52 and accompanying text.
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same, sentencing uncertainties they encountered under the McMillan and
indeterminate sentencing regimes. 9

91. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
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